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Abstract:  
The governance of the Eurozone debt crisis has been characterised by the asymmetric 
distribution of the costs of adjustment, namely the imposition of austerity measures and the 
liberalisation of institutions of industrial relations in debtor countries that were awarded a 
bailout package coupled with the protection of banks from creditor countries. By presenting 
an ideational perspective, this article highlights the role of ideas in explaining these policy 
outcomes. The importance of ideas is contingent upon the manner in which they are framed. 
The process of framing enables policy-makers to build support for policies by presenting 
them in a manner that links an issue with a specific understanding of important economic and 
political developments. Equally, if not more important in the current context of the Eurozone 
debt crisis, the importance of ideas is also contingent upon their influence over the 
maintenance of extant institutional arrangements of Eurozone governance that distribute costs 
of adjustment in an asymmetrical manner. In particular, we illustrate the role of German 
Ordoliberalism in heightening the credibility of the threat of withholding financial assistance, 
in the event of non-compliance with strict conditionality criteria, in the current institutional 
architecture of Eurozone governance.  
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Introduction 
In the context of heightened financial anxieties, Eurozone governments that have received a 
formal bailout package (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) have also implemented many austerity 
measures and introduced important structural changes in their industrial relations systems – 
the latter in the form of the decentralization of collective bargaining and the liberalization of 
collective redundancy schemes (Clauwaert and Schoemann, 2012, Degryse, 2012; Hall, 
2012).2 The introduction of austerity measures and the transformation of industrial relations 
in these three countries is also marked by its inter-state character – these changes having been 
pushed by important creditor countries, most notably Germany; and by supranational actors, 
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namely the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) (Bastasin, 2015; Bini Smaghi, 2013; Schulten and Muller, 2013). 
However, austerity measures and the introduction of structural changes have not been 
imposed on large banks from creditor countries. Financial institutions from northern Europe 
have largely been protected from the potentially negative consequences of their exposure to 
Ireland and Southern Europe (Blyth, 2013; Hall, 2012). What accounts for the ability of 
European states and supranational institutions to impose the burdens of the costs of 
adjustment on debtor countries (and their workers) and not on banks from Northern 
economies?  
       This article presents an ideational perspective that highlights the contingent influence of 
ideas in the governance of the Eurozone debt crisis. Ideas have an important effect on policy 
outcomes as they shape the agency of policy-makers in confronting the structural 
environment in which they are embedded. Ideas constitute cognitive scripts that guide 
strategic behaviour by enabling state officials to interpret events around them and, in turn, 
delineate the range of considered policy options (Blyth, 2003; Campbell, 1998 and 2002). 
Given the presence of clashing cross-national narratives about the roots of the Eurozone debt 
crisis and its policy solutions, analysing the role of ideas provides important insights into the 
governance of the crisis. However, ideas do not translate in an automatic fashion into policies 
on the basis of their merits. The influence of ideas over outcomes is contingent upon two 
factors, namely the manner in which they are framed (Campbell, 2004; Dobbin and Dowd, 
2000; Schmidt, 2008) and their interactions with the institutional context in which they are 
embedded (Hall, 1989; Thelen, 2004). First, framing enables policy-makers to build support 
for new policy proposals by presenting them in a manner that link an issue with a specific 
understanding of the distribution of the costs of adjustment and, as a result, at the expense of 
other interpretations. Second, equally if not more important in the current context of the 
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Eurozone debt crisis, the influence of ideas is also contingent upon its interactions with the 
institutional context in which they are embedded. On the one hand, institutional arrangements 
structure power relations in an unsymmetrical manner among actors (Campbell, 2004; Hall, 
1986). In the context of Eurozone governance, the removal of several strategic mechanisms 
of adjustment, such as currency devaluation and control over the money supply, has 
weakened the bargaining power of debtor countries who are also often facing a balance of 
payments crisis (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012; De Grauwe, 2013). Institutional 
arrangements of Eurozone governance have substantially enabled creditor countries to 
impose their ideas on other member states (Hall, 2012). On the other hand, however, the 
maintenance of institutional arrangements does not occur in an automatic fashion precisely 
because they distribute power in an asymmetric manner (Deeg, 2007; Thelen, 2004). Ideas 
are also important in the reproduction of these extant institutional arrangements, which 
distribute power in an unequal fashion, against challenges from debtor economies and some 
creditor countries, such as France, that have advocated for the introduction of alternative 
institutions of governance at the Eurozone level. Moreover, ideas are important in the 
creation of new institutional arrangements designed to deal with the new environment of the 
debt crisis.           
         An analysis of the influence of the German concept of Ordoliberalism on the 
governance of the Eurozone debt crisis and, ultimately, on the implementation of austerity 
policies and on the liberalisation of key institutional arrangements of industrial relations in 
countries that formally received a bailout package is presented in this article. The idea of 
Ordoliberalism, i.e. the importance of rules in the governance of economic relations, has been 
influential in the governance of the Eurozone through its framing of the provision of financial 
assistance in systemic terms, i.e. to prevent the collapse of the Euro and to avoid generating 
financial instabilities. The concept of Ordoliberalism has also been influential in shaping both 
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the strategic behaviour of German policy-makers in resisting the introduction of new 
institutional arrangements that would have diluted the constraining character of the no bail 
out clause of the Maastricht Treaty and the characteristics of new institutions designed to deal 
with the new environment of the debt crisis.   
         The article is organized as follows. First, an overview of the adjustment process to the 
financial crisis in the Eurozone is provided. Second, we argue that the influence of ideas is 
contingent on how they are framed and on their interaction with the institutional context in 
which they are embedded.. Third, the case of the influence of German Ordoliberalism on the 
governance of the Eurozone debt crisis is analysed. The article concludes by situating the 
influence of ideas in the political science tradition of causal complexity (Hall, 2003; Ragin, 
1987) whereby important outcomes occur as a result of an intersection of factors.  
 
Austerity, the Transformation of Industrial Relations in the Debtor Countries and 
Protection of Banks in the Creditor Countries: An Empirical Overview  
 
The governance of the Eurozone debt has been characterized by the skewed distribution of 
the costs of adjustment (De Grauwe, 2012; Hall, 2012). Under direct pressure from both key 
creditor countries, most notably Germany, and the Troika (ECB, European Commission, and 
International Monetary Fund), policymakers in countries that received a formal bailout 
package also implemented austerity policies and structural changes in the institutional 
arrangements of industrial relations (Degryse, 2012; Schulten and Muller, 2013). By contrast, 
banks from creditor countries, especially but not exclusively French and German financial 
institutions, have been largely protected from their exposure to the obligations (private and 
public) of Ireland and southern Europe (Blyth, 2013).  
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         The scope for outside influence has been particularly prominent for debtor countries 
formally seeking a bailout package (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal). The provision of financial 
assistance in the first Greek bailout package took the form of bilateral loans: 80 billion euros 
from Eurozone fellow members and 30 billion from the IMF (Blyth, 2013: 71; Degryse, 
2012: 25). The rescue package was conditional upon the imposition of austerity measures, 
forced upon the Greek government by the Memorandum of Understanding it agreed with the 
Troika, most notably a freeze on wages and pensions in the public sector and the rise in the 
minimum retirement age, which amounted to an aimed reduction in the budget deficit of 11% 
of GDP within three years (Clauwaert and Schoemann, 2012: 11; Hall, 2012: 363). The 
minimum wage was cut by 22% (32% for workers below the age of 25) – again under strong 
pressures from the Troika (Schulten and Muller, 2013: 10). The Troika also required greater 
flexibility in Greek labour markets, particularly in the area of collective dismissals. Lower 
thresholds were introduced for permanent employees, namely five percent of staff or more 
than 30 employees for companies with more than 150 employees (Clauwaert and Schoemann, 
2012: 13). As a result, the Greek economy experienced an important internal devaluation, i.e. 
reduction in prices and wages relative to other Eurozone members. From 2008 to 2012, its 
relative labor unit costs declined by 11% (DeGrauwe, 2012). Finally, it is insightful to note 
that the provision of financial support to the Greek government in the first bailout package 
took place without negotiations over debt restructuring, i.e. of which loans would be repaid 
and of the allocation of the costs of write-down, despite the preferences of the IMF for 
important debt write-downs (Degryse, 2012: 23). While the IMF expressed serious doubts 
that reductions in the debt-to-GDP ratio could take place without substantial debt write-
downs, the ECB (successfully) argued, with the strong support of the French and German 
governments, that debt restructuring in the form of losses for private bondholders in the midst 
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of a financial crisis would be destabilizing for the future provision of funding by private 
bondholders (Bini Smaghi, 2013: 60-62).  
         The bailout package for Ireland was also characterized by the imposition of severe 
austerity measures, consisting of spending cuts and taxes increases, designed to reduce the 
budget deficit by about nine percentage points in just five years (Hall, 2012: 363). Pay 
freezes for civil servants were universally introduced (2008-2010) by Irish policymakers 
which, in turn, led a decrease of real income of five to eight percent (Schulten and Muller, 
2013: 10). Moreover, the withdrawal of the government from negotiations over public sector 
reform in the context of the previously high level of bargaining centralization, led to the 
almost complete breakdown of the multiple-employer bargaining framework. These policies 
resulted in an important reduction of relative unit labor costs, namely of 23% since 2008 (De 
Grauwe, 2012). The most controversial and contested aspect of the Irish bailout, however, 
was the refusal of three governments, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, to frame 
the rescue package in terms of private bank debt, turning it instead into public debt 
(Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012). After all, the decision of the Irish government to rescue its 
domestic banks, which were seriously exposed to the collapse of the real estate bubble, 
transformed a banking crisis into a sovereign debt crisis. In other words, the provision of 
financial assistance was linked to the nationalization of the debts of Irish banks. Against the 
IMF’s wishes, ECB negotiators and Eurozone finance ministers vetoed attempts by the Irish 
government to impose losses on holders of senior bonds issued by the country’s banks. The 
ECB´s position, namely that the involvement of private bondholders in the losses is 
counterproductive in the midst of a financial crisis, prevailed (Bini Smaghi, 2013: 60-62). 
Financial assistance was provided to the Irish government only under the strict conditionality 
of full protection for bondholders.  
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         The conditionality of the bailout package for Portugal was also characterized by the 
imposition of austerity measures and the introduction of industrial relations reforms. Among 
its most important features were the reduction of financial costs associated with collective 
dismissals (from 30 days per year of seniority to ten), a unilaterally-introduced pay freeze for 
civil servants and employees in public companies (2010-2013), and budget cuts amounting to 
a reduction of its budget deficit by six percent of GDP within three years (Clauwaert and 
Schoemann, 2012: 32; Schulten and Muller, 2013: 8).  
         The management of the Eurozone debt crisis is also characterised by the skewed 
distribution of the costs of adjustment to debtor countries. Banks from creditor countries, 
especially but not exclusively French and German financial institutions, have been largely 
protected from their risky exposure to GIPPS obligations (Blyth, 2013). First, the content of 
the bailout packages is consistent with the type of exposure of lending banks. In Greece, the 
conditionality associated with the provision of funding in the first bailout package enabled 
the Greek government to service its existing debts, i.e. sovereign bonds held by European 
banks with French and German financial institutions being the most exposed (Hall, 2012: 
363-365). In Ireland, in contrast, the provision of financial assistance was designed to enable 
domestic banks to meet their financial commitments. An important factor for the refusal of 
the French and German governments, fully supported by the ECB, to frame rescue packages 
in terms of private bank debt is that French and German banks were themselves major 
bondholders of Irish banks (Bastasin, 2012: 233-236; Degryse, 2012: 34). In both cases, a 
substantial portion of financial assistance provided to debtors (Greek state and Irish banks) 
was devoted to service existing debt. In other words, Northern European governments were 
essentially rescuing their own banks.  
         Second, the Securities Markets Programme of the ECB, which entailed the purchase of 
bonds of GIIPS countries on the secondary bond markets, enabled banks from creditor 
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countries to reduce their exposure to Southern Europe. In the context of anaemic demand for 
the sovereign debt of GIIPS countries, large banks from creditor countries managed to 
successfully reduce their exposure to the sovereign debt of GIIPS countries and, in the 
process, transfer these risks to the ECB. The protective role of the ECB vis-à-vis domestic 
banks of creditor countries is illustrated by the timing and content of the second bailout 
package for Greece. The latter, which was approved in February 2012, was conditional not 
only on the implementation of further austerity measures, but also upon the acceptance of a 
deal whereby private creditors of Greek government bonds, including French and German 
banks, would accept a 53.5% face value loss on their holdings – the so-called ‘haircuts’. 
Nonetheless, the interests of these banks were well protected as their exposure to Greek 
sovereign debt had been substantially reduced prior to the new bailout package. For instance, 
BNP-Paribas was able to lower its exposure to Greek sovereign debt from 4.2 billion Euros 
(end September 2011) to 241 million Euros (end of December 2012); the corresponding 
figures for Deutsche Bank are respectively 875 million Euros and 36 million Euros 
(Guardian, 2013). Under the SMP, French banks were able to unload their exposure to Greek 
sovereign debt as early as May 2010 while German banks sold their stake in Greek debt in 
December 2010 and February 2011 (Bastasin, 2012: 218 and 270). As a result, the share of 
Greek sovereign debt held by private bondholders fell from nearly 99% in 2008 to about 27% 
by March 2012.   
 
Argument: The Contingent Influence of Ideas  
Ideas are influential as they shape the ability of policy-makers to confront the structural 
environment in which they are embedded. There is no denying that the preferences of the 
business community constitute an important factor over policy outcomes in advanced 
capitalist economies (Lindbloom, 1977). This statement is particularly insightful for the 
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management of the Eurozone debt crisis given the too-big-to-fail character of banks of 
creditor countries, especially those headquartered in France and Germany, and their 
importance in the allocation of credit. The exposure of large systemic French and German 
banks, to both private banks and public sovereign debt, is not inconsequential since these 
financial institutions might be too big to bail out given the magnitude of the potential sums 
involved and the inability of Eurozone governments to print money or implement currency 
devaluations (see e.g. Blyth, 2013: 71-75).  
         Yet, the conversion of the preferences of actors, even powerful ones, into desired 
outcomes is characterized by substantial variations across national settings (Esping-Andersen, 
1985; Gallie, 2007). 1 Moreover, and as illustrated in the previous section, the imposition of 
the burdens of adjustment on debtor countries has been influenced significantly by the 
behaviour of creditor countries, most notably Germany; and that of supranational institutions. 
Most, although not all, governments of debtor countries, in contrast, have exhibited marked 
resistance to the implementation of austerity packages and liberalisation measures (Degryse, 
2012). Debtor country governments have been largely forced to implement deeply unpopular 
policies that have generally doomed their prospects for re-election (Armingeon and Baccaro, 
2012). An exclusive focus on the influence of business interests within some creditor 
countries fails to capture important insights associated with inequalities in inter-state 
relations.  
         This article presents an ideational perspective that highlights the prominent, but 
contingent, influence of ideas over the asymmetric distribution of the costs of adjustment in 
the governance of the Eurozone debt crisis. Ideas are influential over policy outcomes 
because they constitute cognitive scripts that enable policy-makers to interpret complex 
political and economic events that, in turn, delineate the range of considered policy options 
(Blyth, 2003; Campbell, 1998 and 2002; Schmidt, 2008). The meaning of important events, 
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such as the Eurozone debt crisis, does not emerge in an automatic fashion given the presence 
of competing interpretations. Moreover, ideational paradigms also exhibit significant 
variations across countries (Dobbin and Dowd, 2000; Hall, 1989). In the context of the 
Eurozone, more specifically, clashing cross-nationally based narratives about the roots of the 
crisis have been presented (Hall, 2012; Young and Semmler, 2011). From the perspective of 
(several) creditor countries, particularly Germany, the severity of the debt crisis reflects: the 
fiscal profligacy of Southern European economies; the financing of a speculative, and thus 
unsustainable, housing boom in Ireland and Spain; and the inability of the industrial relations 
systems of GIPPS economies to control costs (Bini Smaghi, 2013; Hancké, 2013). From the 
perspective of debtor countries, in contrast, the diagnosis of the crisis involves: the 
competitive advantages, perceived as a functional equivalent of currency depreciation, 
associated with the implementation of overly restrictive budgetary policies in Germany and in 
other Northern European economies; the cost advantages associated with the deregulation of 
atypical employment in Germany; and the absence of pan-European institutions to deal with 
private bondholders targeting Eurozone members (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012; De 
Grauwe, 2012).   
         However, the translation of ideas into outcomes – such as the excessively skewed 
distribution of the costs of adjustment in the governance of the Eurozone crisis – does not 
occur in an automatic fashion on the basis of the merits of ideas. The influence of ideas is 
contingent upon two factors: framing, and the interactions of ideas with extant institutional 
arrangements. First, the importance of ideas is tightly linked to the process by which policy-
makers frame issues (Campbell, 1998). Framing involves the portraying of an issue in terms 
of specific beliefs that, in turn, facilitate a particular interpretation of events and provide a 
guide for an actor’s behaviour. By linking an issue to some sets of beliefs, policy-makers 
seek to build support by heightening the resonance of ideas to a specific set of interests and, 
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in turn, by downplaying the connection between that specific issue and other preferences 
(Hall, 1989). Framing thus implies that ideas are judged not only on their merits, but are also 
politically contingent upon the wider sets of issues with which they are associated. In the 
context of the Eurozone, the framing of the crisis in terms of the fiscal profligacy of Greece 
and of the dangerous exposure of Ireland and Spain to a speculative housing boom reflected 
the fears of substantial backlash in creditor countries, particularly in Germany, that could 
result from the enactment of soft conditionality bailout packages for Greece and other 
Eurozone member states (Young and Semmler, 2011). As a result, this specific framing of the 
crisis strengthened the bargaining stance of the Troika and creditor countries by making it 
harder to mobilise electoral support for burden sharing (Degryse, 2012; Hall, 2012). The 
provision of financial assistance to debtor countries, an outcome far from preordained since 
the EMU was explicitly established without an institutionalized ‘transfer union’, took place 
under the enactment of hard conditionality with creditor countries seeking to extract 
maximum concessions from GIPPS governments.  
         Second, and perhaps more important in the case of the Eurozone crisis, the influence of 
ideas over outcomes is also contingent upon the institutional context in which important 
decisions take place and the political process by which these institutional arrangements are 
maintained – two very different political phenomena (Campbell, 2004; Dobbin and Dowd, 
2000; Hall, 1986; Thelen, 2004). Institutional arrangements are influential because they 
structure power relations among actors with different preferences. They do so by reducing the 
range of strategic adjustment options in an unsymmetrical manner. The translation of the 
preferences of actors into specific outcomes is mediated by the institutional framework in 
which they are embedded (Garrett and Lange, 1995; Hall, 1986). The implication is that ideas 
acquire influence not only because of their own merits, or the manner in which they are 
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framed, but also because of the ability of certain actors to impose them on those with 
different preferences.  
         In the current context, the imposition of the burdens of adjustment on debtor countries, 
and on their system of industrial relations, has been facilitated by the current institutional 
configuration of Eurozone governance. The Eurozone is characterised by the removal of 
traditional institutional arrangements that have narrowed the range of adjustment policies of 
debtor countries, thereby reducing their bargaining power (De Grauwe, 2013). Because they 
lack control over the money supply, debtor economies cannot monetize their budget deficits 
to either rescue troubled banks or stimulate economic growth. The Irish case, for instance, 
illustrates how a banking crisis became a sovereign debt crisis as the result of the decisions of 
policy-makers to bail out troubled banks (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012). Debtor countries, 
which also faced balance of payments deficits, are unable to devalue periodically against their 
trading partners (Blyth, 2013: 62-68). As a result, export-oriented countries of Northern 
Europe are able to record balance of payment surpluses without having to fear the 
introduction of competitive devaluations from GIPPS economies (Hall, 2012). Debtor 
countries are also particularly vulnerable to the pressures of bond holders in the current 
institutional architecture of the Eurozone characterised by the lack of a nationally-based 
lender of last resort (De Grauwe, 2013). Eurozone members, who by definition do not have 
their own currency and where government debt is denominated in Euros, do not possess the 
legal means to force the ECB to provide the needed liquidity when hit by economic shocks. 
In a context where national governments lack the ability to print money and devalue their 
currency, investors can become uncertain about the ability of certain Eurozone member states 
to raise enough revenues, or to implement sufficient budget cuts (Armingeon and Baccaro, 
2012; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013). In this situation, the implementation of austerity policies 
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constitutes a privileged signalling mechanism for gaining the confidence of the bond markets 
regarding the solvency of government finances.   
           Moreover, these three institutional features (loss of control over money supply, 
inability to devalue the currency and the lack of nationally-based lender of last resort) would 
not pose a problem if the EU had a transfer union from which debtor countries could benefit 
in a systematic fashion (De Grauwe, 2013). Instead, the governance of the Eurozone is 
characterized by the absence of an “institutionalized” transfer union with a small EU budget, 
representing less than two per cent of GDP, which is tied to two programs: Structural Funds 
and the Common Agricultural Policy (Bastasin, 2012: 256). As a result, the issue of the 
distribution of the costs of adjustment to the financial crisis arises because of the absence of 
supranational mechanisms that would enable EU member states to either provide funding to 
countries targeted by bondholders in a quasi-automatic manner or to allow countries to 
restructure their debt above specifically agreed indebtedness thresholds. Instead, internal 
devaluation in the form of austerity policies has been a prominent mechanism of adjustment 
given the institutional context of the Eurozone. Thus, the asymmetric distribution of the costs 
of adjustment in the governance of the Eurozone reflects the presence of institutional 
arrangements that distribute power in an unequal manner (Hall, 2012; De Grauwe, 2013). 
         Yet, institutional arrangements, while being highly influential over outcomes, do not 
reproduce by standing still (Thelen, 2004). There is nothing automatic and self-reinforcing 
about the maintenance of institutional arrangements precisely because of their distributional 
consequences (Deeg, 2007; Mahoney and Thelen, 2009). Institutional arrangements are 
inherently political. They structure power relations among actors with the implication that 
some actors benefit from extant institutional arrangements, while others may not (Campbell, 
2004; Hall, 1986). Moreover, the lack of automaticity in the process of institutional 
reproduction is also shaped by the range of scenarios for change beyond institutional 
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breakdown (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009). More specifically, endogenous incremental change 
can result in important cumulative changes over time as an alternative to exogenous radical 
transformation. One such scenario of incremental change is that of drift whereby existing 
institutional arrangements do not adapt to environmental changes thereby leading to a 
transformation of their scope and function; another scenario is layering whereby a new 
institution, or an informal practice, is introduced alongside an established one thereby leading 
to the decline in influence of the latter (Thelen, 2003). Therefore, the reproduction of 
institutional arrangements requires active political maintenance against potential challenges. 
        The context of the Eurozone crisis, and the broader issue of sovereign debt more 
generally, highlights the presence of several instances of endogenous changes that would lead 
to a dilution of the influence of the no-bail out clause the Maastricht Treaty without requiring 
its formal institutional dismantling: reduction in interest rates, extension of maturity of loans, 
extensive use of ‘voluntary’ debt restructuring, bilateral loans, and the provision of cheap 
funding to domestic banks contingent upon the purchase of government  bonds. Moreover, 
the lack of conditionality associated with any of these measures would dilute the constraining 
character of the Maastricht Treaty from the current context of the Eurozone debt crisis. This 
is the challenge of institutional layering, i.e. adding new institutions that reduce the influence 
of extant institutions. The challenge of institutional drift, in contrast, highlights the potential 
inabilities of extant institutional arrangements of Eurozone to adapt to the new environmental 
context of the financial crisis. Institutional arrangements could lose their causal influence by 
becoming irrelevant in dealing with new sets of issues. Thus, the influence of ideas lies in 
both preventing the emergence of new institutions that would challenge the influence of 
existing ones; and adapting existing institutions to the challenges associated with the new sets 
of environmental conditions.  
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Ideas and the Governance of the Eurozone Debt Crisis: German Ordoliberalism  
A pervasive and influential idea in the governance of the Eurozone debt crisis, and in its 
diagnosis by the Merkel government, is the concept of Ordoliberalism in German economic 
policy-making (Jacoby, 2014; Young and Semmler, 2011). The concept reflects the combined 
thinking of two groups of scholars: the Freiburg school concerned with the economic order 
for markets (Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm); and sociologists interested in the ethical 
dimensions and social legitimacy of markets (Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rüstow). These 
two groups of German Ordoliberals were influential in the development of the concept of the 
social market economy by Ludwig Erhrard in the late 1940s.2 The concept is characterized by 
three features. First, German Ordoliberalism refers to a legal order based on the importance 
of regulation and rules to prevent both: a) unfettered market forces determining outcomes; 
and b) the concentration of economic power in the hands of private interests (Beck, 2013). 
Markets do not emerge naturally, but need to be created and maintained by state regulation 
for securing the joint outcome of fostering competition and undermining the ability of private 
actors to concentrate economic power. Cartels and monopolies cripple the price mechanism 
and restrict individual freedom. Second, Ordoliberalism also stands against the 
implementation of economic policies that generate moral hazard by removing personal 
responsibility and liability for the adverse consequences of one’s course of actions (Young 
and Semmler, 2011). The focus on market discipline, an inherent aspect of Ordoliberalism, 
reflects the dangers associated with unchecked risky behaviour for financial stability (Woll, 
2014: 65-69). Third, Ordoliberalism is inclined towards rule-based governance of economic 
policy whereby the function of the government in the economy is to provide a steering role 
via the setting up of the broad parameters of markets (Sally, 1996). This is a specific 
understanding of what makes an economy competitive (Wolf, 2014: 54-59). Ordoliberalism 
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is suspicious of both laissez-faire with its artificial separation between the state and the 
market; and of activist macroeconomic management such as Keynesianism that provides 
policy-makers with discretionary powers.  
         In the context of the Eurozone debt crisis, the concept of Ordoliberalism has been an 
important factor in the Merkel government framing the crisis in terms of fiscal fickleness and 
speculative riskiness that, in turn, has resulted in a positioning favoring austerity policies in 
GIPPS countries. For German policy-makers, Southern European labour markets 
(employment protection and wage bargaining) have been deemed inflexible and a barrier to 
addressing issues of balance of payments deficits and cost controls (Bini Smaghi, 2013; 
Hancké, 2013: 1-13). The aggressive labour market adjustments of the German economy 
(Hartz reforms), in contrast, have been praised as showing the way forward for the European 
periphery (Bini Smaghi, 2013; Young and Semmler, 2011). Moreover, the concept of 
Ordoliberalism has been invoked to explain the reluctance of the Merkel government to 
pursue reflationary policies in Germany as a strategy to reduce balance of payments 
imbalances between Northern and Southern Europe (Hall, 2012). Productivity and economic 
performance under German Ordoliberalism result from micro regulation and supply-side 
reforms, not from macroeconomic expansionist policies. Thus, in the view of German policy-
makers, the issue with reflationary policies is not only that they would fail to generate 
economic growth in GIPPS countries, but that they would be unlikely to work even in 
Germany. Finally, the concept of moral hazard has been frequently adduced by the German 
government for the imposition of hard conditionality on bailout packages and for the refusal 
to support the introduction of Eurobonds (Bini Smaghi, 2013: 49-55; Degryse, 2012: 35). 
Breaking budgetary commitments on deficits by Greece has been interpreted as the avoidance 
of one’s responsibilities while the dangerous exposure of Irish and Spanish banks to housing 
activities illustrates the concept of liability whereby one must assume responsibility when 
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things go wrong (Beck, 2013). Instead, German policy-makers have sought to strengthen 
budgetary rules rather than implement reflationary policies in order to restart economic 
growth, that is they have exported rules and principles throughout the Eurozone (Wolf, 2014: 
54). These efforts resulted in the reconfiguration of the Stability and Growth Pact via the 
enforcement of fiscal discipline, the so-called Six-Pack mechanism.  
         The above discussion of the pervasive influence of Ordoliberalism provides important 
insights for understanding the process of the preference formation of German policy-makers. 
However, the European dimension of the management of the crisis, namely the asymmetric 
distribution of the costs of adjustment, remains only partly explained. Three puzzles stand 
out. The first one reflects the presence of clashing cross-national narratives in the Eurozone, 
and the substantial opposition to austerity measures in Greece and other GIPPS countries, that 
illustrates the little resonance of the concept of Ordoliberalism   in debtor economies (Beck, 
2013; Young and Semmler, 2011). Why has the framing of (some) creditor countries 
triumphed?  
         The second puzzle stems from the observation that diametrically opposed sets of 
policies have been advocated under the ideational guidance of the concept of Ordoliberalism 
in Germany (Jacoby, 2014). The internal debate in Germany regarding the most effective 
management of the European debt crisis highlights the division of Ordoliberals on the most 
important issues. This division reflects the importance of two concepts with starkly different 
policy implications: systemic risks versus moral hazard (Woll, 2014: 65-70). The protection 
of domestic (German) banks, for instance, has been presented as necessary to prevent the 
collapse of systematically important financial institutions – the combined assets of the largest 
three banks amounting to 118 percent of the German GDP (Bastasin, 2015: 15). On the other 
hand, German Ordoliberals have also favored the downsizing of domestic banks since their 
rescue would amount to moral hazard in the context of previously undertaken risky activities 
 18 
 
by financial institutions – thereby violating the principle of personal responsibility and 
liability (Jacoby, 2014: 77). Similarly, the provision of finance to other Eurozone member 
states has witnessed the presence of Ordoliberals on both sides of the issue. The commitment 
to the European project has meant that targeted rescue packages with strict conditionality 
criteria are essential in order to prevent thecontagion of the crisis and the potential collapse of 
the Eurozone (Young and Semmler, 2011). On the other hand, the institutionalization of a 
new financing scheme (ESM) and the intervention of the ECB on secondary bond markets 
without the corresponding introduction of EU-based budget czars, with substantial control 
over the domestic finances of countries seeking financial assistance, has also been interpreted 
as a dilution of the original EMU rules (Degryse, 2012; Jacoby, 2014: 73). Thus, the concept 
of Ordoliberalism constitutes a poor predictor of the behaviour of the German government 
with its focus on systemic risks at home and on moral hazard in the rest of the Eurozone (Co-
author’s name removed; Woll, 2014).  
         The third puzzle is that the concept of Ordoliberalism is uninfluential in France – the 
second biggest creditor economy in the Eurozone regarding the exposure of its domestic 
banks to GIPPS countries. From an ideational perspective, the position of French policy-
makers in the governance of the Eurozone debt crisis has been characterized by the 
continuing importance of the idea of state intervention in the economy (Degryse, 2012; Hall, 
2012: 366-368). Economic policy-making in France highlights the presence of a substantial 
gap between the extensive economic adjustment that has taken place in the last twenty-five 
years and the underdeveloped legitimation of market mechanisms. The impressive 
transformation of the French economy, made possible by the enhanced role of market forces 
relative to that of the state in the allocation of resources, took place in a context where the 
electorate still attached considerable importance to Republican ideals and still assigns a pre-
eminent role to state activism (Schmidt, 2007). The reason for the discrepancy between the 
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increasing importance of market mechanisms and continued attachment to state intervention 
is that policy-makers framed globalization in distasteful terms in order to avoid taking 
responsibilities for tough decisions. The consequence is that the introduction of further 
austerity policies to reduce budgetary deficits remains a tough proposition to sell to a 
reluctant French electorate. What, then, accounts for the prominence of the German concept 
of Ordoliberalism in the governance of the Eurozone debt crisis?  
         Ideas did not triumph on the sole basis of their merits.3 Our ideational perspective also 
highlights the importance of the contingent character of the influence of ideas (Campbell, 
2004; Dobbin and Dowd, 2000; Hall, 1989) in the context of an inter-state Eurozone 
framework.  First, the influence of ideas is contingent upon their framing that privileges a 
specific understanding of the distribution of the costs of adjustment and, as a result, at the 
expense of other interpretations – especially when fitting with the communicative discourses 
of policy-makers (Schmidt, 2008). A common aspect of the framing of the crisis by the 
German government is its systemic character, namely that the failure to provide financial 
assistance to countries targeted by bondholders could result in serious contagion effects that 
would threaten the survival of the Eurozone. Its support for the provision of financial 
assistance to Greece and other Eurozone members was framed within the perspective of 
preserving the maintenance of the Euro and in avoiding financial instabilities – not out of 
solidarity (Bastasin, 2015: 146-159: Jacoby, 2014). The German government also reiterated 
the compatibility of the bailout packages with the no bail-out clause of the Maastricht Treaty, 
namely that the provision of financial assistance was ‘voluntary’ and received the approval of 
the Bundestag.  Such framing was designed to rally reluctant, if not outright hostile, public 
opinion and to overcome the potential legal objections of the Karlsruhe constitutional court. 
Moreover, this framing was also invoked in its support of the decision of the ECB to buy 
bonds of GIPPS countries on secondary markets – the Securities Market programme – despite 
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the strong opposition of the Bundesbank (Bastasin, 2012: 195-218). In addition to the 
emphasis on the exceptional circumstances of financial markets, the German government 
stressed that its decision was designed to preserve the autonomy of the ECB in the context of 
strong attempts at political interference -- principally from Sarkozy but also from debtor 
countries. The shortcoming of this framing of the crisis, from the perspective of Eurozone 
governance, is that Merkel’s strategy was far more effective in times of high financial 
contagion – that is when the crisis indeed threatened the survival of the monetary union 
(Blyth, 2013; Eichengreen, 2015).  
         Second, the influence of Ordoliberalism also lies in its interactions with the institutional 
framework of Eurozone governance. As mentioned in the previous section, current 
institutional arrangements seriously restrict the range of adjustment strategies available to 
debtor countries targeted by private bondholders (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012; De 
Grauwe, 2013). The institutional framework of Eurozone governance has structured, in an 
asymmetric manner, the distribution of power among member states that, in turn, facilitated 
the implementation of austerity policies and the liberalisation of employment relations in 
GIPPS economies (Blyth, 2013; Hall, 2012). Nonetheless, institutional arrangements have 
required strong political support that have been legitimized by the concept of Ordoliberalism 
in two ways.  
          In the first instance, the reproduction of extant institutional arrangements has been 
made possible by the non-introduction of alternative institutions (institutional layering) that 
would have diluted the constraining character of the no-bail clause of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Most prominently, German policy-makers successfully resisted proposals by the Sarkozy and 
Hollande governments for an EU Commission-backed facility whereby the Commission 
would itself sell bonds guaranteed by Eurozone members (Bastasin, 2012: 180-218; Degryse, 
2012). The French proposals were made at several junctures: negotiations during the first 
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Greek rescue plan; negotiations during the Ireland rescue plan; the November 2011 summit 
between France, Germany and Italy in the context of financial contagion to Italy and Spain; 
and at the EU summit in June 2012. For the German government, this option was considered 
a form of Eurobond financing scheme that would not only hurt Germany’s credit ratings, but 
would also dampen efforts to reduce budget deficits in some other Eurozone members 
(Degryse, 2012: 23 and 35; Bini Smaghi, 2013). Enabling debtor countries to raise financing 
via the mechanism of Eurobonds, thereby avoiding strict conditionality requirements, would 
be rewarding moral hazard behaviour.  
          Additionally, the influence of Ordoliberalism was also prominent in the set-up of new 
institutions designed to deal with the crisis. The institutional arrangements of the Maastricht 
Treaty were not designed to deal with issues of sovereign debt since central bank 
independence was seen as a strong disciplinary mechanism on inflationary countries (Hall, 
2012). The failure of the institutions of Eurozone governance to adapt to the new 
environment of the financial crisis would have been conducive to institutional drift, which is 
a transformation of their scope and functionability (see e.g. Thelen, 2003). Therefore, the 
provision of financial assistance was crucial in preventing the implosion of the single 
currency. Equally important, Germany and other creditor countries were able to exercise 
significant control over the formation of the new mechanism of financial assistance (EFSF 
and now ESM) (Bastasin, 2012: 205-218). The ESM board decides on issues of increases in 
the size of the fund and in the type of conditionality associated with the approval of requests 
on the basis of a qualified majority of 80 percent of the votes, thereby providing both 
Germany (27.07) and France (20.3) with veto power. The creation of the EFSF/ESM is also 
interesting in regard to the various options that were rejected, most notably the set-up of an 
EU Commission-backed facility whereby the Commission would itself sell bonds guaranteed 
by Eurozone members alongside the ESM. As a result, Germany and other creditor countries, 
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most notably Finland and the Netherlands, prevented the ESM from becoming a large fiscal 
union with automatic transfers (Donnelly, 2014).           
         As a result, the causal influence of the concept of Ordoliberalism in the current 
Eurozone institutional setting lies in the narrowing of the range of potential scenarios faced 
not only by debtor countries, but also by bondholders, an important shortcoming in the 
current institutional set-up of the Eurozone. Private bondholders of GIPPS obligations faced 
three potential scenarios, located on a continuum, between October 2009 (election of the 
Papandreou government) and August 2012 (Draghi’s London speech) (De Grauwe and Li, 
2013; Leblond and Chang, 2015). The first one is characterised by the implementation of 
Pan-European guarantee schemes whereby the debt of individual member states is guaranteed 
by the rest of the Eurozone regardless of its level. The second scenario entails the undertaking 
by individual governments of budget reforms and of liberalisation of the institutional 
arrangements of employment relations, potentially accompanied by financial assistance, 
designed to restore the confidence of bondholders. The third scenario is characterised by the 
partial/full repudiation of its debt by a Eurozone member.  
         The adherence of the Merkel government, and of the bulk of the German political class, 
to the concept of Ordoliberalism created serious doubts about whether Pan-European 
solutions (scenario #1) would be implemented to deal with the debt volume of GIPPS 
countries (Bini Smaghi, 2013; Degryse, 2012). This is a dangerous situation in the context of 
the institutional configuration of the Eurozone. The absence of a lender of last resort at the 
European level raises doubts in the minds of private bondholders about whether specific 
Eurozone member states will be able to raise enough revenue, or to implement sufficient 
budget cuts, to meet their debt obligations. In contrast to countries with their own currencies, 
Eurozone members cannot print their own currency nor can they legally force the ECB to 
provide the needed liquidity in times of economic upheaval (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013). Thus, 
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private, bondholders increasingly perceived the outcome of the process of adjustment as 
being contingent on the ability of GIPPS policy-makers to introduce and implement austerity 
measures and to liberalise institutional arrangements of employment relations – until the 
intervention of the ECB in the form of Draghi’s famous speech on “whatever it takes” 
(Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012).  
 
Conclusion  
This article examined the character of Eurozone crisis governance. An important feature of 
the management of the financial crisis has been its inter-state component. Creditor countries, 
particularly Germany, and the Troika, have been influential in the introduction of austerity 
measures and of structural changes in the form of the decentralization of collective 
bargaining and the liberalization of collective redundancy legislation (Degryse, 2012; 
Schulten and Muller, 2013). The management of the sovereign debt crisis is also distinctive 
due to its asymmetric character, namely the absence of restructuring measures and structural 
changes on large banks from creditor countries involved in cross-national lending (Blyth, 
2013).  
         The causal influence of ideas to account for the asymmetric character of the distribution 
of the costs of adjustment in the Eurozone has been presented in this article. Ideas are 
conceptually important as they highlight the role of policy-makers in confronting the 
structural environment in which important policy decisions take place (Campbell, 1998 and 
2002; Dobbin and Dowd, 2000; Schmidt, 2008). However, the influence of ideas over policy 
outcomes does not rest solely on their merits; it is also contingent upon the manner in which 
they are framed and on their interactions with the institutional context in which they are 
embedded (Campbell, 2004; Hall, 1989; Thelen, 2004).  
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         Our argument contributes to important methodological discussions in political science, 
and the social sciences more generally, about the nature of causation (Hall, 2003; Ragin, 
1987). In contrast to studies (qualitative and quantitative alike) that seek to identify the direct 
effects of hypothesized independent variables as stand-alone explanations, ideas are 
conceptualized as being part of a phenomenon of complex causation whereby an outcome 
results from potentially different combinations of factors. Our analysis illustrates that the 
mechanisms by which ideas are translated into outcomes constitute a complex phenomenon 
characterised by an intersection of factors. The methodological insights of our argument casts 
doubts on research designs framed as a paradigm war between different approaches.  
        The influence of German Ordoliberalism over the governance of the Eurozone debt 
crisis incorporates the importance of interest-based explanations. The exposure of large 
systemic financial institutions – mainly French and German banks – to the obligations of the 
GIIPS economies is not inconsequential since their national governments cannot print money 
or implement unilaterally monetary policies of quantitative easing (Blyth, 2013). A banking 
crisis could easily become a sovereign debt crisis. Nonetheless, an important issue remains: 
why have the costs of adjustment been disproportionally imposed on debtor countries? 
Similarly, an ideational perspective fits perfectly well with an institutional approach that 
emphasizes the importance of institutions in the asymmetric distribution of power across 
national settings. Nonetheless, the reproduction of institutions, and the stability of their 
influence, do not occur in an automatic fashion. The ideational perspective presented in this 
article complements interest-based and institutionally-oriented approaches. 
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1 For instance, the recent near-universal rescue of financially troubled banks in the credit crunch of 2008-09, 
notwithstanding the notable exception of Lehman Brothers, was also accompanied by substantial cross-national 
variations regarding the conditions attached to bailout schemes (Woll, 2014). Despite facing similar challenges 
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in preventing the collapse of major financial institutions, policy-makers exhibited marked discretion in the 
design of bailout schemes: cheap (United States) versus expensive (United Kingdom) pricing of government 
support; extensive (France) versus limited (Germany) involvement of the private sector in the financing of 
rescue schemes; and neutral/positive (France/Denmark) versus negative (Iceland/Ireland/United 
Kingdom/United States) contributions of bank rescue schemes to the public budget.  
 
2 See Sally (1996) for an historical analysis of the concept of Ordoliberalism.  
 
3In fact, the concept of Ordoliberalism has been sharply criticized on the basis of its failure to distinguish 
between liquidity and solvency crises (Grauwe and Ji, 2013; Wolf, 2014) and its lack of fit with the 
macroeconomic conditions of low growth (Blyth, 2013).   
 
